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1 . INTRODUCTION 
I n s u r an ce  f i r m s  b a s e  t h e  premiums t h e y  charge  on a dv i c e  
from a c t u a r i e s .  But d e s p i t e  t h e  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  s t a t i s t i c a l  
a p p a r a t u s  t h a t  a c t u a r i e s  a r e  t r a i n e d  t o  manipu la te ,  t h e y  can 
no t  f o r e c a s t  t h e  p r o f i t s  ( o r  absence  o f  l o s s e s )  f o r  t h e  i n -  
su r ance  f i r m  w i t h  p e r f e c t  accuracy .  Indeed,  a c t u a r i e s  do n o t  
c l a i m  such accuracy .  P r o f i t s  o f t e n  depend on t h e  c o r r e c t n e s s  
o f  gues s e s  t h a t  a c t u a r i e s  have made abou t  t h e  e xpe c t e d  l o s s e s  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i n s u r a n c e  c o n t r a c t s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s .  
The l i n k a g e  between t h e  a c t u a r y ' s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  expected  
l o s s  o r  "pure  premiums" and t h e  a c t u a l  premium t h e  f i r m  would 
charge  i s  n o t  v e r y  c l e a r  i n  t h e  a c t u a r i a l  l i t e r a t u r e .  There i s  
always assumed t o  be some " loa d ing"  o r  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  pure  
premium. P a r t  o f  t h e  l o a d i n g  goes t o  cover  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
c o s t s - - s e l l i n g  c o s t s ,  b i l l i n g ,  c l a im s  p roc e s s ing ,  and t h e  l i k e .  
Th i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  l o ad in g  i s ,  i n  t h e  more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  t r e a t -  
ments ,  s a i d  t o  be  i d e a l l y  e q u a l  t o  t h e s e  c o s t s ,  a l t hough  t h e  
problem of  j o i n t  c o s t s  and t h e i r  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  n o t  e x p l i c i t l y  
con f ron t ed .  The c r u c i a l  q u e s t i o n ,  however, i s  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
of  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t  of  t h e  l o a d i n g ,  t h e  e xc e s s  ove r  t h e  pure  premi- 
um and expenses .  
 his p a r t  i s  v a r i o u s l y  a l l e g e d  t o  be a  ' s a f e ty  
loading", to be a fair profit, or to be a way of bringing in 
that amount of revenue which maximizes some ad hoc firm utility 
function (Bfihlmann, 1970). Discussion in the actuarial litera- 
ture is very much in the spirit of searching for a cost or dis- 
utility justification for a positive margin over costs and ex- 
pected losses. It almost never defines the optimal premium in 
terms of the parameters of the firm's demand function as well as 
its price, precisely because neither expected profit maximization 
nor competition are assumed. 
Economic analyses, in contrast, have typically assumed 
expected profit maximization, and appealed to the law of large 
numbers as a justification--with free entry and "large" numbers 
of insurance contracts, zero expected profit is an equilibrium 
condition (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1974). They have also been 
concerned a great deal with competitive equilibria. However, 
there has been virtually no explicit attention paid to the 
question of equilibrium market behavior when the data available 
to the firm is not sufficient to permit estimation with virtual 
certainty of the expected loss per contract of a particularidentified 
class of insureds. This is despite the focus in the economic 
literature on situations in which the firm is imperfectly in- 
formed about the loss probability of a set of individuals; the 
economic literature has not analyzed the process by which in- 
surance firms obtain and use information to sharpen their 
estimates. 
This paper will attempt to use some old and some new 
notions of the process of premium adjustment, or "credibility" 
as it is called in the actuarial literature, to specify how 
insurance firms might estimate loss probabilities. But then it 
will also describe the characteristics of market equilibrium 
premia in a world where many insurers are engaged in the same 
premium estimation process. 
One conclusion of the paper will come as no surprise to 
economists, though it is at variance with the usual actuarial 
approach. The process by which the equilibrium premium is de- 
termined will be shown to depend on demand-side conditions as 
well as on expected losses (however forecasted). Another, 
perhaps less obvious, conclusion is that this equilibrium in- 
surance premium can be represented (ignoring administrative 
costs) as the sum of the expected loss (called the "pure 
premium") and an additional amount to be added for risk, e v e n  
i f  t h e  i n s u r e r  i s  r i s k  n e u t r a l .  That is, the optimal and 
equilibrium pricing strategy for any insurance firm will in- 
volve adding such an addition to its best estimate of the pure 
premium. Perhaps even more surprisingly, it can be shown that 
the average premium actually charged when all firms follow such 
a process will be just equal to the pure premium that would be 
estimated by a person who had all of the information available to 
all firms available to him. Sometimes the actual premium will 
even be exactly equal to the fully informed pure premium. A final 
section shows that insurer desires for more accurate data (as 
embodied, for example, in industry rating bureaus) may involve ex- 
cessive expenditures on data management and unnecessary temptations 
to deviate from the competitive path. 
What little we know about the real world suggests that 
actual premium setting behavior falls somewhere between 
following actuarial advice to the letter and competitive equi- 
librium in a large-numbers situation. For example, in 
automobile rate hearings in New Jersey, an insurance firm 
official gave the following description of the use of data re- 
lating losses to a driver's traffic violation record: 
We have followed at times very closely the experience 
being developed by the driver record classes, and other 
management have come in and said, no, there are such 
strong competitive disadvantages to that kind of opera- 
tion ... that you end up with a class of business that is 
so bad in relation to what other companies are willing to 
write that you just price yourself completely out of the 
market. So in the past several years we have not followed 
the actuarial indications in our driver record class re- 
lativities. We have kept them in line with our competition 
and also looked at our experience to see just how that was 
working out ... (State of New Jersey Department of In- 
surance, 1981). 
The relevance on competitive prices of other firms and actual 
profit experience suggests that something more than credibility is 
needed to explain insurer pricing hehavior. 
2 .  INSURER MAXIMIZATION, ACTUARIES, AND THE PREIMUM 
DETERMINATION PROCESS 
An i n s u r e r  shou ld  set i t s  p r i c e  f o r  insurance  s o  a s  t o  
a c h i e v e  i t s  o b j e c t i v e s .  A c t u a r i a l  t h e o r y  a s  such  i s  o b v i o u s l y  
n o t  c a p a b l e  o f  saying what f i r m  o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  o r  ough t  t o  be .  
And y e t  a c t u a r i e s  a r e  h i r e d  t o  o f f e r  a d v i c e  on what premiums t h e  
i n s u r e r  shou ld  c h a r g e .  Formally speak ing ,  t h e n ,  t h e  a c t u a r y  
ough t  t o  have some model o f  t h e  f i r m ' s  o b j e c t i v e s  i n  mind i n  
o r d e r  t o  judge what i n f o r m a t i o n  he shou ld  convey. I n  p r a c t i c e ,  
however, t h i s  model h a s  o f t e n  been i m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  rules of  thurnb 
sugges ted .  Where t h e r e  h a s  been some e x p l i c i t  concern  f o r  ob- 
j e c t i v e s ,  t h a t  concern  has  been s a t i s f i e d  s imply  by choosing a f i r m  
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i n  a n  ad hoc way ( F r e i f e l d e r ,  1975) w i t h o u t  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  marke t s  i n  which ownership o f  i n s u r a n c e  
s t o c k s  i s  bought  and s o l d  o r  t o  t h e  marke t s  i n  whiCh f i r m s  com- 
p e t e  t o  s e l l  i n s u r a n c e ,  
The s p e c i f i c  p a r t  of a c t u a r i a l  t h e o r y  w i t h  which w e  s h a l l  
d e a l  i s  concerned w i t h  d e t e r m i n i n g  premiums f o r  i n s u r e d s  whose 
expec ted  l o s s  o r  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  l o s s  i s  known t o  be  i d e n t i c a l ,  
b u t  whose v a l u e  i s  not known w i t h  ( v i r t u a l )  c e r t a i n t y .  However, 
t h e r e  i s  some d a t a  s u g g e s t i n g  what t h a t  expec ted  l o s s  i s .  T h i s  
d a t a  c o u l d  e i t h e r  be  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  i n s u r e d ' s  
r e c e n t  l o s s  e x p e r i e n c e ,  o r  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  o t h e r s  who a r e  
s i m i l a r  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  ways. I n  e i t h e r  c a s e ,  t h e  number o f  ob- 
s e r v a t i o n s  on r i s k s  known t o  b e  i d e n t i c a l  i s  assumed t o  be  i n -  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  p e r m i t  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  law of  l a r g e  numbers t o  d e t e r -  
mine t h e  premium e n t i r e l y  from t h e  d a t a .  The way i n  which 
p a r t i a l  o r  incomple te  i n f o r m a t i o n  shou ld  b e  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  
premium d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  c a l l e d  ' ' c r e d i b i l i t y  t h e o r y "  (see, f o r  
example, Langley-Smith, 1962) .  A b r i e f  summary o f  s e v e r a l  
v e r s i o n s  o r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  c r e d i b i l i t y  w i l l  be provided below. 
W e  w i l l  c o n s i d e r  a  market  w i t h  s t o c k  i n s u r a n c e  f i r m s  
s e l l i n g  i n s u r a n c e  t o  c o v e r  l a r g e  numbers o f  independen t ly  ( b u t  
n o t  i d e n t i c a l l y )  d i s t r i b u t e d  l o s s e s .  I f  t h e  c a p i t a l  market  i s  
assumed t o  f u n c t i o n  w e l l ,  t h e  most p l a u s i b l e  model of  t h e  i n d i -  
v i d u a l  f i r m  i s  t h a t  it s h o u l d  behave s o  a s  t o  maximize expec ted  
p r o f i t s .  While it i s  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  l o s s e s  ex- 
ceed premiums by more t han  a  g iven f i x e d  d o l l a r  amount rises a s  
t h e  number of persons  i n s u r e d  a t  a  g iven  premium i n c r e a s e s ,  t h e  
r i s k  p e r  s h a r e  and sha reho lde r  approaches a  n e g l i g i b l e  amount 
i f  t h e  number of  s h a r e s  and sha reho lde r s  i n c r e a s e s  p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  even i f  t h e  r i s k  pe r  s h a r e  ( s ay ,  t h e  va r i ance  i n  
per-share  ea rn ings  due t o  underwr i t ing  l o s s e s )  i s  n o t  ze ro ,  i f  
s t ockho lde r s  ho ld  d i v e r s i f i e d  p o r t f o l i o s  ( i nc lud ing  smal l  f r a c -  
t i o n s  of t h e  s tock  o f  many insurance  f i r m s ) ,  t h e  random r i s k  
f o r  any one f i r m  should  be t r e a t e d  a s  i f  it w e r e  n e g l i g i b l e .  
This  model may w e l l  n o t  be c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  how insurance  
f i r m  managements a c t u a l l y  do behave, though I do n o t  b e l i e v e  
t h e r e  i s  any d e f i n i t i v e  evidence.  I n  any c a s e ,  i f  p r e s e n t  
reward s t r u c t u r e s  a r e  a l l e g e d  t o  induce management t o  behave i n  
an e x c e s s i v e l y  r i s k  a v e r s e  way, t h a t  on ly  r a i s e s  t h e  f u r t h e r  
q u e s t i o n  o f  why s tockho lde r s  choose reward s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  pro- 
duce r e s u l t s  a t  va r i ance  w i th  t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s .  Perhaps t h e  
t r u e  model i s  one i n  which f i r m  managers have a  good d e a l  more 
c o n t r o l  ove r  underwr i t ing  p r o f i t s  than  w e  w i l l  g i v e  them h e r e ,  
There i s  a  f i n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  de t e rmina t ion  o f  
a c t u a l  premiums, which w e  w i l l  n o t  be a b l e  t o  discuss--whether 
t h e  market can reasonably  be modelled a s  compe t i t i ve  on t h e  
demand s i d e .  I f  it cannot ,  because of  impe r f ec t i ons  i n  consumer 
i n fo rma t ion ,  t h e n  f i rms  may p r i c e  t o  some e x t e n t  a s  d i s -  
c r i m i n a t i n g  monopol is ts ,  overcharg ing  those  w i t h  few a l t e r n a -  
t i v e s  more than  t h o s e  w i t h  many. This  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  f i t s  
some of  t h e  s t u d i e d  f a c t s ,  b u t  n o t  a l l - - i t  means t h a t  f i rms  
should  seek more s t r e n u o u s l y  a f t e r  t h e  bus ines s  of  t h o s e  who 
w i l l  be overcharged.  
3 .  VERSIONS OF C R E D I B I L I T Y  THEORY 
C r e d i b i l i t y  becomes an i s s u e  whenever t h e  number of  persons  
of a  p a r t i c u l a r  r i s k  t ype  becomes t o o  sma l l  t o  o b t a i n  a n  e s t i m a t e  
o f  expected l o s s e s  f o r  t h e s e  persons  i n  p e r i o d  t + l  by merely 
observ ing  t h e  average l o s s  i n  pe r iod  t. ( C r e d i b i l i t y  of  a  
d i f f e r e n t  b u t  r e l a t e d  s o r t  a l s o  becomes r e l e v a n t  when t h e r e  i s  
r e a s o n  t o  s u s p e c t  t h a t  t h e r e  h a s  been a s t r u c t u r a l  change be- 
tween t h e  two p e r i o d s . )  When a l l  l o s s e s  canno t  b e  e s t i m a t e d  
p e r f e c t l y  a c c u r a t e l y ,  some a l t e r n a t i v e  way must be  found t o  g e t  
a n  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  expec ted  l o s s .  The s m a l l - s i z e  sample mean 
c o u l d  s t i l l  be used ,  b u t  it may be  d e s i r a b l e  t o  combine t h a t  
i n f o r m a t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  o r  judgment t h e  f i r m  may have.  
For  r e a s o n s  o f  s i m p l i c i t y ,  I w i l l  t r e a t  o n l y  a  one-per iod  
model i n  which all f i r m s  announce t h e i r  premiums s i m u l t a n e o u s ~ l y  a t  
t h e  beg inn ing  o f  t h e  p e r i o d ,  and have exogenously  g i v e n  sets o f  
d a t a .  C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  u s i n g  one p e r i o d ' s  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  
l o s s e s  o r  o t h e r  f i r m s '  p r i c e s  t o  set  premiums f o r  f u t u r e  p e r i o d s  
w i l l  n o t  be  i n c o r p o r a t e d  h e r e .  
The o b j e c t i v e  of  t h e  f i r m  i s  t o  maximize t h e  expec ted  
v a l u e  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  premiums it c o l l e c t s  and t h e  
c l a i m s  and expenses  it pays  o u t .  I f  w e  i g n o r e  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
expenses ,  t h e  e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t  can  be  w r i t t e n  most s imply  a s :  
where P j  i s  t h e  f i r m  j I s  premium p e r  d o l l a r  o f  i n s u r a n c e  charged i 
t o  pe r son  i , Xi i s  t h e  amount o f  i n s u r a n c e  purchased by p e r s i o n  i 
from f i r m  j ,  and g i  i s  p e r s o n  i t s  probabilityoflossperdollarof i n -  
s u r a n c e  coverage .  H e r e  w e  a r e  assuming t h a t  t h e  c o n t r a c t  i s  one 
which pays Xi d o l l a r s  i n  t h e  event ' la  l o s s "  o c c u r s  w i t h  p r o b a b i l -  
i t y  O i -  
The f i r s t  t e r m  i s  t h e  f i r m ' s  t o t a l  revenue,  and t h e  second 
t e r m  i s  t h e  f i r m ' s  e x p e c t e d  l o s s  on i t s  p o r t f o l i o  of  i n s u r a n c e  
c o n t r a c t s .  S i n c e  P! and X' a r e  known t o  f i r m  j ,  i t s  expec ted  i 
p r o f i t  depends o n l y  on t h e  O i .  
I f  a l l  f i r m s  know $ f o r  e v e r y  p e r s o n ,  c o m p e t i t i v e  i - 
e q u i l i b r i u m  o b v i o u s l y  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  P? = $i f o r  a l l  i and j. 
1 
I f  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  i s  s a t i s f i e d ,  n o t  o n l y  does  ( 1 )  h o l d  f o r  t h e  
c u r r e n t  p o r t f o l i o  o f  c o n t r a c t s ,  b u t  it i s  a l s o  e a s y  t o  see, i f  
cus tomers  o n l y  purchase  from f i r m s  w i t h  t h e  lowes t  P t h a t  i ' 
t h e r e  i s  no set  of  p r i c e s  o t h e r  t h a n  P! = Q i  which a l s o  s a t i s -  
1 
f i e s  ( 1 ) .  
The more r e a l i s t i c  problem t h a t  c r e d i b i l i t y  t h e o r y  was 
i n t e n d e d  t o  s o l v e  i s  t h e  one i n  which t h e  f i r m s  do n o t  know a l l  
o f  t h e  O i  beforehand.  How might a  f i r m  e s t i m a t e  O i l  and what 
would t h e  r e s u l t i n g  p a t t e r n  o f  p r i c e s  be?  A f i r m  c o n t e m p l a t i n g  
s e l l i n g  a  p o r t f o l i o  o f  c o n t r a c t s  Xi does  n o t  r e a l l y  know what 
i t s  expec ted  l o s s  o r  "pure  premium" i s .  I n s t e a d ,  a t  b e s t  it 
w i l l  have some d a t a  on p a s t  l o s s e s  f o r  t h e  i p e r s o n s ,  o r  pe r -  
s o n s  s i m i l a r  t o  them i n  p a r t i c u l a r  ways. ( I t  may a l s o  have d a t a  
on c u r r e n t  p r e c a u t i o n s  t a k e n  t o  p r e v e n t  l o s s ,  b u t  I w i l l  assume 
h e r e  t h a t  t h e  O i  a r e  f i x e d . )  A n e c e s s a r y  ( b u t  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t )  
c o n d i t i o n  f o r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  market  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  t h e r e f o r e  an  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  how each  f i r m  j d e t e r m i n e s  $j i t s  e s t i m a t e  o f  i' 
p o t e n t i a l  cus tomer  i t s  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  loss.  
" C r e d i b i l i t y "  i s  t h e  l a b e l  i n  t h e  i n s u r a n c e  l i t e r a t u r e  f o r  
t h i s  t o p i c .  A g e n e r a l  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  t h a t  c r e d i b i l i t y  means " t h e  
s y s t e m a t i c  a d j u s t m e n t  o f  i n s u r a n c e  premiums a s  c l a i m s  e x p e r i e n c e  
i s  o b t a i n e d . "  (Hickman, 1975, p.181). Rutwhat i s  t h e  system, and 
what i s  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  of t h e  system? A more o p e r a t i o n a l  d e f i n i -  
t i o n  of  c r e d i b i l i t y  i s  t h a t  it i s  "a  l i n e a r  e s t i m a t e  of t h e  t r u e  
( i n h e r e n t )  e x p e c t a t i o n  d e r i v e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  compromise between 
h y p o t h e s i s  and o b s e r v a t i o n . "  ( H e w i t t ,  1 9 6 3 ) .  For  example, suppose 
a  f i r m  j knows t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  N p e r s o n s  b i t h  i d e n t i c a l  c h a r a c t e r -  
i s t i c s  f a c i n g  t h e  p o s s i b l e  l o s s  o f  $1 ,  and t h a t  t h e i r  t o t a l  l o s s e s  
have amounted t o  $ S  i n  a  r e c e n t  p a s t  t i m e  p e r i o d .  Then w e  c o u l d  
f o r m u l a t e  t h e  expec ted  loss  p e r  d o l l a r  o f  coverage  a s :  
A '  S m: = z ( = )  + ( I - z ) ~  . ( 2 )  
H e r e  Z i s  t h e  " c r e d i b i l i t y "  w e i g h t ,  and i s  t o  be t h o u g h t  of  a s  a  
f u n c t i o n  of  N o r  S ,  w h i l e  m i s  some p r i o r  or hypothes ized  v a l u e  
A j  
o f  m i .  The presumpt ion  i s  u s u a l l y  made t h a t  e s t i m a t i n g  8' i s  i 
- 
enough t o  t e l l  t h e  f i r m  how t o  set  p i .  For  example, F r e i f e l d e r  
(1975) i n t e r p r e t s  t h e  a c t i o n  t h a t  s h o u l d  f o l l o w  from o b s e r v a t i o n  
o f  loss d a t a  a s  t h e  s e t t i n g  o f  a  premium. While t h i s  r e s u l t  
would occur  i n  F r e i f e l d e r ' s  model because  o f  t h e  p o s t u l a t e d  
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  f o r  t h e  f i r m  and because  of  t h e  assumed absence  
o f  an  e f f e c t  of premium v a r i a t i o n  on t h e  f i r m ' s  demand, I w i l l  
argue  t h a t  t h e  a c t i o n  o f  s e t t i n g  t h e  premium w i l l ,  i n  compe t i t i ve  
e q u i l i b r i u m ,  depend on more t h a n  t h e  f i r m ' s  e s t i m a t e  of ex- 
p e c t e d  l o s s e s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  I w i l l  argue  t h a t ,  even if t h e  
f i r m  i s  r i s k  neu t raZ ,  it w i l l  s t i l l  make a  " r i s k  ad jus tment"  o f  
i t s  e s t i m a t e  o f  expec ted  l o s s e s  t o  de te rmine  t h e  compe t i t i ve  
e q u i l i b r i u m  premium i t  w i l l  charge .  That  i s ,  i t s  premium w i l l  
s t i l l  exceed i t s  expec ted  l o s s .  Th i s  r i s k  ad jus tment  w i l l  de- 
pend i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  way on t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  i n su red  
hazard ,  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  @ a c r o s s  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  i 
and t h e  number o f  i n s u r a n c e  f i rms .  
How a r e  Z and m t o  be determined i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  c r e d i b i l i t y  
t he o r y ?  Rules  o f  thumb a r e  used t o  select a  number of  observa-  
t i o n s  t h a t  would be g i v e n  " f u l l  c r e d i b i l i t y " .  For example, i f  
t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  a c c i d e n t s  were thought  t o  bePoisson,  then  
one v e r s i o n  o f  f u l l  c r e d i b i l i t y  would r e q u i r e  a  t y p e  of  r i s k  t o  
have exper ienced  1084 l o s s e s  (SRI, 1976) f o r  f u l l  c r e d i b i l i t y .  
A t  t h i s  number o f  l o s s e s ,  w e  would have 90 p e r c e n t  confidence of  
making an e r r o r  of  no more t h a n  5  p e r c e n t .  (Note t h a t  a s  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  l o s s  f a l l s ,  more exposures  w i l l  be needed t o  
g e n e r a t e  t h e  r e q u i r e d  number o f  l o s s e s ) .  
I f  t h e r e  a r e  fewer o b s e r v a t i o n s  t h a n  t h i s  i n  a  c e l l ,  b u t  
t h e r e  a r e  more t h a n  1054 l o s s e s  i n  t h e  f i r m ' s  e n t i r e  p o r t f o l i o  
o f  c o n t r a c t s ,  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  p rocedure ,  s t i l l  used w i t h  
r e g a r d  t o  so - ca l l ed  "secondary"  r a t i n g  f a c t o r s ,  i s  t o  e s t i m a t e  
t h e  pure  premium a s  a  weighted  average  of  t h e  c e l l  mean and t h e  
o v e r a l l  mean. Suppose, f o r  example, t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  2  c l a s s e s ,  
one w i t h  18,000 o b s e r v a t i o n s ,  enough f o r  f u l l  c r e d i b i l i t y ,  and 
a  d l  of  0.0944, and one w i t h  2000 o b s e r v a t i o n s ,  300 l o s s e s ,  and 
an  observed Q 2  of 0.15. The o v e r a l l  @ i s  t h en  0.1. The pre-  
l i m i n a r y  p u re  premium f o r  c l a s s  2  i s  g iven  by E ( @  ) = .5 ( . l )  + 2  
+ . 5 ( . 15 )  = .125, where 0.5 i s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  we igh t  recommended 
by c r e d i b i l i t y  t h e o ry .  T o  main t a in  r a t e  adequacy, bo th  t h e  . I25  
and .0944 v a l u e s  must t h e n  be " s c a l e d  up" s o  t h a t  t h e i r  average  
i s  a g a in  0.1, y i e l d i n g  t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  a d j u s t e d  pure  premiums of 
= .0969 and Q 2  = .128. 
There a r e  two t y p e s  of  q u e s t i o n s  one might  r a i s e  abou t  t h i s  
procedure :  
(a) What statistical decision theory (if any) would 
justify this rule-of-thumb procedure, or are there 
better ways of using the same information? 
(b) If all firms follow this rule of thumb and base actual 
premiums on the pure premium thus calculated, what 
will market equilibrium be like? 
The first question is one that has recently been investi- 
gated by actuarial theorists and statisticians (Chaing and 
Fairley, 1979, Tomberlin, 1981), but an implicit assumption in 
virtually all that literature (the only expection I have seen 
is Taylor, 1975) is that the insureds whose experience generated 
the data will remain with the firm regardless of the premium 
structure it selects. But it is exactly the implausibility of 
this assumption that the second question addresses, and so we 
will begin with it. We use an example based on the SRI report 
(1976) to illustrate. 
Assume that there is a large number of insurance firms all 
of which have identical numbers of type-1 and type-2 customers 
in their initial portfolios. Each firm only knows the ex- 
perience of its own insureds, and it can distinguish type-1 and 
type-2 persons perfectly. The true probabilities of loss are 
.15 and .0944 respectively, each firm has 2000 type-2 customers 
and 18,000 type-1 customers. 
We can suppose therefore that each firm tries to use data 
on the loss experience of the sample of 2000 customers to 
estimate the type-2 population mean (which actually is .15). 
There will, however, be sampling errors, so that some firms 
will observe more than 300 losses, and others fewer. In the 
next round, if firms construct their premiums based on their ex- 
perience by using credibility rules, the firms that experienced 
fewer than 300 losses will set P2 below .128, and Pl below 
0,0969. In contrast, firms with more than 300 losses will set 
both P1 and P2 higher. 
The question then is: can this pattern of prices, which 
are structured to produce rate adequacy for each firm, repre- . 
sent a competitive equilibrium? The answer is obviously not. 
Type-2 consumers will purchase from the lower priced firms, 
who are charging them less than 0.128. Even if these firms 
should also get all type-1 customers and charge them .0969, they 
will suffer from rate inadequacy, and if they obtain less than 
all low risks, or charge them less than .0969, their deficits 
will be even worse. Thus the use of traditional credibility 
methods is not consistent with competitive equilibrium; those 
firms that are "lucky" enough to have large market shares will 
suffer losses. 
If customers are not distributed uniformly across firms, 
the results are even more striking. Suppose firms on average 
have 10 percent high risks in their portfolios, but there are 
some with very few high risk (type-2) customers. Then they will 
charge a premium close to 0.0944 to type-1 customers, and will 
attract almost all of them. But, because the experience of 
their few type-2 customers gets a low credibility weight, they 
will charge type-2 customers a premium that is also close to 
0.0944 (though it will be higher than the premium for type-1 
customers). Consequently, such firms will get virtually all 
customers of both types. But since their average premium will 
be below 0.1, they will suffer losses. 
If firms sell to both high and low risk groups, then the 
final level of profit using traditional credibility approaches 
depends on the mix of such groups. Empirically, it seems that 
less than fully credible groups are more likely to be high 
risk than low risk, so that the prediction of negative profits 
is still warranted. 
This type of credibility bias has been criticized in the 
literature, and firms now frequently are advised to use methods 
which yield unbiased estimates of cell means. Some of these 
methods are versions of least-squares curve fitting (to either 
a linear or multiplicative specification), and there have also 
been some empirical Bayes methods that take into account the 
credibility of large cells (Tomberlin, 1981 ) ) .  While there may 
still be some slight systematic bias in methods actually used-- 
Fairley et al. ( 1  9 8 0 )  allege that the multiplicative method 
usually employed still overcharges high risks--the bias appears 
to be small. Does this mean competitive equilibrium exists with 
Pi " $i? 
Unfortunately, the answer is negative. To see this, con- 
sider an unbiased estimation method that yields a ;' i with the 
following properties: 
2 
where E is an error term with mean zero and variance a , 
E 
If credibility is at issue, there will be some firms whose 
sample will, under ideal procedures, yield a $: which is less 
than 4i. ~ u t  if they base their premium on this estimate, then 
they will attract all of the customers but will sustain a loss. 
2 The larger is a&, the more serious a problem this will be. In 
any case, simply basing actual premium on estimated pure premiums 
cannot be consistent with competitive equilibrium once firms 
begin to detect that they always lose. That is, the use of 
credibility rules is not consistent with competitive equilibrium. 
4, LONG-RUN COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM WITH LESS-THAN-FULLY 
CREDIBLE DATA 
The previous section showed that, under a wide variety of 
credibility procedures, firms will be likely to lose money if 
they based their actual premiums on pure premiums. The low- 
bidder always understimates; he is subject to the "winner's 
curse". One may suppose that firms will recognize this, They 
will recognize that, should they be the low bidder, they will 
g e t  most o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s  b u t  s u f f e r  l o s s e s .  From t h i s  specu la -  
t i o n  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  t h i n k  of a  f i r m  deve lop ing  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
s t r a t e g y .  I t  does  n o t  know whether  it w i l l  be t h e  f i r m  w i t h  t h e  
sample w i t h  t h e  l o w e s t  mean, b u t  i f  it i s ,  it wants  t o  make s u r e  
t h a t  it w i l l  n o t  l o s e  money. The f i r m  can  e s t i m a t e ,  on a v e r a g e ,  
how f a r  away t h e  l o w e s t  mean of  N samples of some s i z e  w i l l  be 
from t h e  t r u e  mean. Without  more, it can  e x p e c t  t o a t  l e a s t b r e a k  even 
by add ing  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  t o  i t s  pure  premium. I f  it i s  t h e  
low e s t i m a t o r  because  it had t h e  l o w e s t  sample,  it w i l l  g e t  
a l l  t h e  b u s i n e s s  and b r e a k s  even.  I f  it i s  n o t  t h e  low 
e s t i m a t o r ,  it g e t s  no  b u s i n e s s  o f  t h i s  t y p e  and b r e a k s  even.  One 
e q u i l i b r i u m  s t r a t e g y  i s  t h e r e f o r e  f o r  f i r m s  t o  add t h i s  " r i s k  
premium" ( t h e  same f o r  a l l  f i r m s )  t o  t h e i r  p u r e  premium, 
I f  t h e r e  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  many f i r m s  t h a t  expec ted  p r o f i t s  
g e t  b i d  down t o  z e r o  a f t e r  t h i s  c o r r e c t i o n ,  a t  what p r i c e  w i l l  
i n s u r a n c e  f i n a l l y  b e  purchased?  The p r i c e  w i l l  b e  t h e  e s t i m a t e  
o f  t h e  t r u e  v a l u e  made by t h e  f i r m  w i t h  t h e  l o w e s t  sample mean. 
( A s  n o t e d  above,  however, t h i s  e s t i m a t e  exceeds  t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  
p u r e  premium.) For  expec ted  p r o f i t s  t o  be  z e r o  i n  t h e  l o n g  r u n ,  
t h o s e  e s t i m a t e s  must have an  expec ted  o r  ave rage  v a l u e  which i s  
e q u a l  t o  t h e  t r u e  v a l u e .  T h i s  i s  s o  whether  " t r a d i t i o n a l "  o r  
"improved" c r e d i b i l i t y  r u l e s  a r e  used .  Thus, i n  t h e  long  r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m ,  P .  does  i n d e e d  e q u a l  m i  on a v e r a g e ,  even though,  
1 
f o r  a l l  f i r m s ,  P: > m i .  
While t h i s  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e  w i l l  have an  expec ted  v a l u e  of  
m i ,  t h e  accuracy  i s  a l s o  i m p o r t a n t .  Is t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e  f o r  
l e s s - t h a n - c r e d i b l e  r i s k  c l a s s e s  always e q u a l  t o  m i ,  o r  i s  t h e i r  
s u b s t a n t i a l  v a r i a n c e  around m i ,  v a r i a n c e  which i n d u c e s  p e o p l e  
t o  purchase  non-optimal amounts o f  i n s u r a n c e ?  The answer depends 
on how p r e c i s e l y  t h e  l o w e s t  sample t r a c k s  t h e  t r u e  v a l u e .  
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e r e  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  no  g e n e r a l  t r e a t m e n t  o f  
t h i s  m a t t e r  i n  t h e  b i d d i n g  l i t e r a t u r e .  I n s t e a d ,  r e s u l t s  have 
been o b t a i n e d  w i t h  f a i r l y  a r b i t r a r y  assumpt ions  a b o u t  t h e  re- 
l a t i o n s h i p  between Si o f  t h e  l o w e s t  f i r m  and m i .  The work o f  
Wilson (1977) and Smiley (1979) p r o v i d e s  examples o f  t h e s e  s p e c i a l  
c a s e s .  I n  what f o l l o w s  I r e s t a t e  t h e i r  models i n  t e r m s  o f  i n -  
s u r a n c e .  
Consider a population of R potential insureds of a particular 
risk class, all of whom will purchase full coverage insurance at 
any premium below some reservation premium P. There are N in- 
- 
surance firms, and each firm has obtained a sample of data on 
past losses of size R/N. Each sample of data can be thought of as 
random sample (without replacement) of the experience of the 
population R. We assume that a sample size R/N is not "fully 
credible". 
Call pi the mean or average loss in the data firm i has ob- 
served. Given that it has observed pi in its sample, each firm 
i could estimate the distribution of possible values of the 
population mean p and come up with a best guess estimate of 
A 
p, or -pi. This process is really what credibility theory is 
intended to discuss, and we can represent it in a general way 
by the use of Bayes' formula, as 
where fi(p/pi) is the posterior distribution of p for firm i 
1-I 
conditional on its having observed p and g(p) is its prior it 
probability density function, assumed to be the same for all 
A 
firms. Then its estimate of p, or pi, is just the mean of 
i 
fp (phi) r or . Of course, we can represent the posterior 
. . 
distribution either as fi (p 1 p . ) or fi (p 1 C .  ) . 1-1 1 1-1 1 
The bidder's estimates , conditional on p, are assumed 
to be iid with a cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) 
6 
F (pilp). The form of F depends on the form of the initial 
1-1 : 1-1 4 
I I 
distribution of loss-production events. It is assumed that 
A 
F is known to all firms, but aht no firm knows the pi i 
of another firm. (Thus all firms know the form of F but not 
pi 
p itself. They perceive p as an unkown parameter of the dis- 
A 
tribution of p.). 
1 
Each firm uses its knowledge of p, pi, F , g (p) , and the 
pi 
number of firms to formulate a premium bid pi which will maximize 
the expected profit from selling insurance. The firm's profit 
is (p,-p) if it submits the lowest premium bid and zero other- 
I 
A 
wise. The rule for transforming p or pi into pi is the i-th i 
firm's pricing strategy, and it obviously corresponds to the 
crediblity problem that actuaries are trying to solve. The 
A 
bidding rule is represented by.the function pi(pi). Bidders 
are assumed to recognize their interdependence but not to collude. 
- 
h 
- 
Each firm selects a pricing strategy function, pi(pi) (=pi(pi)), 
A 
which maximizes its expected profit, given :+(pi).   his process 
defines the set of Nash equilibrium strategigs lai]. Finally, 
all bidders use the same equilibirum strategy 6 so the equilibrium 
will be a symmetric equilibrium. If is differentiable and 
- 
> 0, the expected profit of the i-th firm, conditional on p i 
and ii, is 
where fi (p 1 Gi) is the posterior distribution of p for firm i 
lJ 
--I conditional on Ci (or pi), p is the inverse of the equilibrium 
n-I --I strategy of the (n-I ) other firms and FA (P (p (Gi) ) ( P) is the 
pi 
A probability that firm i submits the lowest bid, given p,, p, p2 
I I 
and ij. 
Differentiation with respect to pi (ti) = (ti) yields the 
necessary condition for an optimal bid: 
The terms in the square brackets capture the two offsetting 
effects on the firm's expected profit of raising its premium: 
the profit earned if it is the lowest bidder increases, but the 
likelihood of its being the lower bidder decreases. 
Wilson shows that, if certainregularityassumptions aremade about 
the relationship between the lowest pi and p, the lowest bid which 
wins all the business converges in probability to p as N approaches 
infinity. For finite but large N, this means that the price at 
which insurance is sold should be quite close to the true pure 
premium p even though no firm knew the value of p to start with. 
This result has exceedingly strong and interesting im- 
plications. It means that, if the regularity conditions hold, 
then the price at which business is transacted is independent 
of the prior distribution g(p); in effect, each bidder's knowl- 
edge that there is enough information in the system to estimate 
p almost exactly induces bidders to follow behavior for which 
p a p is the outcome. 
The assumed regularity conditions do, however, put some 
limits on the application of Wilson's theorem to the insurance- 
credibility problem. The critical condition is that the minimum 
A 
pi that can be observed must be a strictly decreasing function of 
p. That is, there must be a one-to-one correspondence between the 
lowest possible pi and p. If the "samples" of firms are very small, 
and if p is small and has a distribution like the Poisson, then the 
^min 
smallest possible sample mean will be pi = 0. Even if p is varied 
over some range, the smallest sample is still likely to have zero 
losses in it, so that the regularity condition is not satisfied. 
Clearly, if this happens, then firms observing such a sample will 
have to base their bid on g(p), and so the minimum bid will be 
somewhere between p and g(p). If the sample sizes are suffi- 
ciently large that the probability that the lowest sample mean 
is zero becomes very small, then the impact of g(p) on the 
winning bid disappears. It would be desirable to establish 
analytically the relationship between the winning bid, p, g(p), 
and the sample size; one suspects that the result would be 
something similar to credibility, but established on a basis 
quite different from that of credibility theory. 
The other desirable excercise would be to solve analytically 
for the winning bid as a function of n for specific values of R ,  
the distribution of losses, and g(u). The only attempt to do 
this of which I am aware is in Smiley's study of oil bidding 
(Smiley, 1979). He actually used a model designed by Rothkopf 
(1969), which is aspecial case of Wilson's model under the 
assumption that each bidder knows the distribution of the ratios 
of the bidders' estimate to the a priori estimate of the true 
value. Even with this restrictive assumption, and even after 
assuming convenient forms for the distribution of F (cil p) , Smiley 
is able to derive an analytical result using Rothkopf's procedures 
only by assuming further that g(u) is a flat and diffuse prior, 
so that "the bidder's prior expectations about (p) do not shift 
the posterior expected value away from the estimate." Such an 
assumption seems quite restrictive, and leaves open the question 
of what will happen if g(p) is not so loose. 
One suspects that there may be some intermediate value of N 
which makes the actual price closest, on average, to the correct 
price. For if N = 1, the monopolist correctly estimates u, but 
charges the monopoly price. But if R/N is small the lowest ui 
is almost surely going to be zero, so that the estimate of p 
will depend primarily on imprecise prior beliefs. Some value 
of N between these two extremes may achieve an appropriate 
compromise between accuracy of estimate and reduction in 
monopoly distortion. 
There are two extensions to this analysis that move in the 
direction of more realism, but also more complexity. One ex- 
tension is to assume that the low bidder does not receive all 
of the insurance business, but rather only a fraction which is 
larger than the fraction received by the next highest bidder. 
The second extension is to assume that the total amount of in- 
surance purchased is an inverse function of price; indivudual 
demand curves are not perfectly inelastic. We consider the 
first extension first. 
To get a zero profit equilibrium when some insurance is 
sold at a p in excess of p, we could assume that there is some 
fixed cost c to being in business at all. This avoids the 
problem that posting a very high price always yields a positive 
expected profit. Let pi now be the u n i t  price of insurance 
charged by firm i, and let Xi be the total number of units 
bought. The firm's expected profit is defined as 
One simple way to set things up is to define Xi as a func- 
tion of pi, Pi ' and n. Equilibrium then obtains with a d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  of Pi's such that expected profit is zero at every 
pi, which in turn implies that the number of firms offering 
any price rises as the price rises. This gets us into the well- 
known complexities of specifying models in which there is an 
equilibrium distribution of prices. All we can say is that, in 
equilibrium, the premiums will still be of the form pi > pi but 
now the difference will vary across firms. Whether the differ- 
ence will be related to the ci (and the pi), and, if so, how, is 
a topic that we will not pursue here. It is obvious that the 
average difference for any class of insureds is going to be re- 
lated to search behavior by consumers as well as to the level 
and distribution of the pi, so here there will be an additional 
reason why p will diverge from p in equilibrium. i i 
If aggregate demand 1xi is a function of price, then the 
i 
equilibrium q u a n t i t i e s  will obviously depend on this responsive- 
ness. How the equilibrium price distribution varies with overall 
demand elasticity needs to be incorporated into the solution of 
a problem like that is described in the previous paragraph. 
5, INDUSTRY RATING BUREAUS, THEIR IMPACT ON COMPETITION, AND 
THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO CREDIBILITY 
Insurance industry rating bureas in the United States 
typically perform five functions: 
1) They compile and average past loss data for prespecified 
policyholder characteristics. (It is not clear if they 
could or would produce special tabulations for other 
non-standard characteristics, or whether, if they did, 
they would communicate the requests to other insurers). 
2) They trend past loss data to furnish estimates of future 
losses. 
3) They compile and average expense data. 
4) Based on (2) and (3), and on assumptions about profit 
margins, they publish suggested premiums. 
5) They file these suggested premiums in so-called "prior 
approval" states, where the premiums are usually ap- 
proved by the state regulatory body as maximum and 
minimum premiums unless a firm can support a request 
for a deviation. 
In all of these functions the bureaus are protected from 
anti-trust action by state law and by the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act exemption from federal scrutiny. 
The question is whether some or all of these activities 
ought to be so exempted. The collection and compilation of past 
data is generally thought to be justified on two grounds: 
1) "Collection of past cost data by an industry association 
has generally been considered lawful." 
2) "In the case of joint pooling and calculation of past 
loss data,efficiencies are likely to be great and the 
anti-competitive potential small... Such collective 
activity is likely to have a procompetitive effect ... 
where many firms will not have a sufficiently large 
policyholder base to make their own actuarially sound 
computations." (National Commission for the Review of 
Antitrust Laws and Procedures, 1979). 
Trending f o r  f u t u r e  l o s s e s  has  been viewed a s  an open 
q u e s t i o n .  The r e a l  c r i t i c i s m  o f  r a t i n g  bureaus  on a n t i - t r u s t  
grounds i s  a p p l i e d  t o  bureau  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  d a t a  on expenses ,  
and t h e  use  o f  t h a t  d a t a  t o  p r o j e c t  f u t u r e  p r i c e s .  (These p r i c e s  
might  be  " sugges ted"  e i t h e r  t o  a l l  i n s u r a n c e  f i r m s  o r  t o  a  s t a t e  
r e g u l a t o r y  commission.) I t  i s  a l l e g e d ,  f o r  example, t h a t  i n  
I l l i n o i s  where o n l y  p a s t  l o s s  d a t a  may be exchanged,  t h e  market  
h a s  f u n c t i o n e d  a s  w e l l  a s  o r  b e t t e r  t h a n  i n  s t a t e s  where a l l  
d a t a  i s  exchanged. ( I b i d )  . 
Cons ide r  a n  i n s u r e r  f i r m  i c o n s i d e r i n g  e n t e r i n g  a " s m a l l  
c e l l "  marke t ,  where it h a s  o n l y  a  p a r t i a l  sample of  d a t a .  It 
must e s t i m a t e  a  breakeven premium - Xij+eij ,  where X i s  i j  
i t s  expec ted  u n d e r w r i t i n g  l o s s  and e i s  i t s  expec ted  expense .  i j  
The c r u c i a l  q u e s t i o n s  would appear  t o  be: 
1) Without  any new d a t a ,  how does  it e s t i m a t e  X i j  and 
e i j '  and how d o e s  it respond t o  u n c e r t a i n t y ?  
2 )  What d a t a  would "sharpen"  i t s e s t i m a t e  of e i t h e r ?  
I f  it knew t h e  indus t ry -wide  X i j ,  would t h e r e  s t i l l  be 
a  g r e a t  d e a l  o f  v a r i a n c e  i n  i t s  e s t i m a t e  of e i j ,  and 
how would t h a t  a f f e c t  i t s  p r i c i n g  behav io r?  How would 
knowing p a s t  e i j ' s  be d i f f e r e n t  from o t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  
on p a s t  c o s t  d a t a ?  W e  need t o  know how c a t e g o r y -  
s p e c i f i c  a r e  t h e  e ' s .  
3 )  I n  what way i s  communication of t h e  e ' s  d i f f e r e n t  
from t h e  approved communication of  p a s t  l o s s  c o s t s t h a t  h a s  
g e n e r a l l y  n o t  been found t o  b e  i l l e g a l ?  
I n  what f o l l o w s  I i g n o r e  t h e  l e g a l i t y  i s s u e  and c o n c e n t r a t e  
on t h e  s o c i a l  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s .  The pr imary  p o i n t  I wish t o  make 
i s  t h a t  t h e  s o c i a l  g a i n  from c o l l e c t i o n  and a g g r e g a t i o n  of  l o s s  o r  
c o s t  d a t a  i s  g e n e r a l l y  much less t h a n  t h e  p r i v a t e  g a i n  t o  ex- 
p e c t e d  p r o f i t  maximizing i n s u r a n c e  f i r m s .  R e s t r i c t i o n  of  t h e i r  
a b i l i t y  t o  assemble  such d a t a ,  f a r  from r e d u c i n g  t h e  o v e r a l l  
e f f i c i e n c y  o f  market  o p e r a t i o n ,  may a c t u a l l y  improve w e l f a r e .  
Any g a i n s  from c u t t i n g  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  of  c o l l u s i o n  would be  
added to these production efficiency improvements. Consequently, 
the notion that anti-trust action would compromise legitimate 
efficiency advantages from information exchange is not well 
founded. 
~f insurance firms' owners are risk neutral, as would be 
expected in a world of diversified investment portfolios, then 
the primary social cost of incorrect premium estimation would be 
the excess burden associated with the purchase by consumers of 
the "wrong" amount of insurance. If the premium actually charged 
is above the risk neutral premium based on the full set of data, 
then some mutually beneficial transaction will not have occurred; 
too little insurance will be bought. If premiums are set too low, 
then an excessive amount of risk will have been transferred ex 
post, in the sense that less insurance and a lump sum transfer 
would be preferred both by insurer and by insurance firm if there 
are loading costs. In any case, it is clear that there can be 
some distortions in demand. However, these welfare costs are 
likely to be relatively small if demand is fairly inelastic, or 
if the quantity of insurance is constrained by legal rules (e.g., 
compulsory auto liability insurance). In contrast, the costs of 
producing information can be large, especially in a competitive 
equilibrium. 
To see this, we need to model the process by which informa- 
tion about the loss experiences of firms is generated and aggre- 
gated. For simplicity, we will consider here only the two extreme 
possiblities: (1 ) S e p a r a t e  f i r m  e q u i  Z i b r i u m :  All firms use only 
their own past data, which is available at zero cost (the model 
discussed in the previous section), or (2) R a t i n g  bureau  e q u i l i b -  
r i u m :  Every firm gets data on the industry experience in return 
for furnishing its own data and paying a pro-rated share of the 
cost of maintaining and using the data pool. We will not in- 
vestigate here the possibility of combining subsets of data larger 
than a single firm's sample but smaller than the industry set, 
with some firms participating and some firms not. We only ob- 
serve that there may well be equilibria with such combinations, 
and those equilibria may dominate either of the two extreme 
cases. 
To illustrate how inefficiency can occur, we now show that 
a rating bureau equilibirum may be stable, but represent lower 
welfare than a separate firm equilibrium. Suppose that the in- 
formation collected from all n firms in the industry would permit 
exact estimation of p, but that collection of this information, 
analysis of the data, and distribution of the results to the firms 
has a total opportunity cost of $C, or a cost per firm of c = C/n 
for each of n identical firms. 
If c is sufficiently small, the rating bureau equilibrium 
in which each firm provides its data, pays $c to the rating 
bureau, and charges a premium p = p+c may be a Nash equilibrium. 
Suppose all other n-I firms except firm i already belong to the 
rating bureau; they will charge a price approximately equal to 
p, and firm i could join at a price of c. To decide whether it 
should do so or not, it must compare the profits it could achieve 
if it joined (zero) with the profits it would earn if it priced 
as best it could using only knowledge of pi but paying no rating 
bureau membership cost. Firm i knows that all other firms will 
charge p+c, but it does not know what p is; it only knows pi, 
Suppose that a firm observes some p i ' Given this observa- 
tion, the firm estimates a distribution of p given by fi(plpi), 
and therefore a distribution f(p+clpi). With this estimated 
distribution, the firm can then formulate a bid pi = E(p+c) - E. 
(Wesuppose that the firm is sufficiently small that ~(p+c) is 
unaffected by its sample.) The firm's expected profit conditional 
on having observed pi would therefore be 
where p is the lowest possible p. We can think of this expression 
- 
as having two parts: (1) over the range from p to p, the firm 
- 
losesmoney ,  w h i l e  ( 2 )  o v e r k h e r a n g e  f r o m y t o y + c - E  it makes p o s i t i v e  
p r o f i t s .  (Above y+c-E it g e t s  no b u s i n e s s . )  I f  it happens t h a t  
t h e  second p a r t  i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  f i r s t ,  t h e  f i r m  h a s  p o s i t i v e  
expec ted  p r o f i t s  f o r  t h i s  y i ' One can t h i n k  of  e s t i m a t e d  ex- 
p e c t e d  p r o f i t s  f o r  a l l  v a l u e s  o f  p i ,  given  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
pi ( o r  f  ( y i  1 y )  g  ( y )  ) . I f  it happens t h a t  t h i s  o v e r a l l  expec ted  
p r o f i t  i s  p o s i t i v e ,  t h e n  t h e  f i r m  i s  b e t t e r  o f f  by n o t  p a r t i c i -  
p a t i n g  i n  t h e  r a t i n g  bureau .  I n  such a  c a s e ,  a  r a t i n g  bureau 
w i t h  f u l l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i s  n o t  a  Nash e q u i l i b r i u m .  But i f  ex- 
p e c t e d  p r o f i t s  a r e  n e g a t i v e ,  a s  would o c c u r  i f  c  i s  s m a l l ,  t h e n  
f i r m  i i s  b e t t e r  o f f  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  t h a n  n o t  p a r t i c i p a t i n g .  But 
s i n c e  a l l  f i r m s  a r e  i d e n t i c a l ,  no f i r m  w i l l  g a i n  by n o t  p a r t i c i -  
p a t i n g ,  s o  t h e  r a t i n g  bureau  e q u i l i b i r u m  i s  a  Nash e q u i l i b r i u m .  
I n  t h e  r a t i n g  bureau  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  a l l  f i r m s  c h a r g e  a  p r i c e  
p  = y+c. I n  t h e  s e p a r a t e  f i r m  e q u i l i b r i u m  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  
p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n ,  t h e  market  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e  h a s  a  mean of  y 
b u t  a  v a r i a n c e  o - > 0 .  The t r a d e o f f  is obv ious :  by s a c r i f i c i n g  
$C o f  r e s o u r c e s  s o c i e t y  can  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  v a r i a t i o n  i n  premiums 
a b o u t  i t s  t r u e  v a l u e .  The w e l f a r e  l o s s  from premium v a r i a t i o n  
h a s  two p a r t s .  F i r s t ,  r i s k  a v e r s e  p e r s o n s  a r e  worse o f f  i f  t h e  
premium i s  a  random v a r i a b l e .  But i f  t h e  premium i s  s m a l l  re- 
l a t i v e  t o  w e a l t h ,  t h i s  change i s  t r i v i a l .  Second, one mycompare  
t h e  consumers '  s u r p l u s  from a  p r i c e  t h a t  i s  n o t  a lways  e q u a l  t o  p 
t o  t h a t  from a  p r i c e  always set  a t  y+c. The d i f f e r e n c e  c o u l d  be  
e i t h e r  p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e ,  depending on t h e  s i z e  o f  c  r e l a t i v e  
2 t o  o . Even i f  more consumers '  s u r p l u s  i s  l o s t  under  t h e  s e p a r a t e  
f i r m  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  t h i s  amount must s t i l l  b e  compared t o  t h e  r e a l  
c o s t  o f  o p e r a t i n g  t h e  bureau.  
~t i s  o b v i o u s l y  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  exceeds  t h e  former ,  
s o  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  w e l f a r e  l o s s  from c o l l e c t i o n  of  d a t a .  The 
r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  l o s s  i s  t h a t  knowledge o f  p ,  which i s  what i s  
b e i n g  bought ,  does  n o t  a f f e c t  what p  t u r n s  o u t  t o  be.  The i n -  
fo rmat ion  i s  u s e l e s s  i n  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  a c t u a l  amount o f  r e a l  
r e s o u r c e  l o s s ,  however u s e f u l  it i s  i n  e s t i m a t i n g  beforehand how 
much t h a t  l o s s  w i l l  be.  I f  p e o p l e  a r e  r i s k  a v e r s e ,  t h e r e  i s  some 
u t i l i t y  g a i n  from knowing t h e  v a l u e  of  t h e  expec ted  l o s s  b e f o r e -  
hand,  b u t  t h a t  g a i n  can w e l l  be  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  g a i n  ( i n t h e  s e n s e  o f  
l o s s  avo ided)  t o  f i r m s  from such knowledge. A s  i n  t h e  Gaskins  
( 1 9 7 6 )  model o f  a u c t i o n i n g  o i l  l e a s e s ,  t h e  p r i v a t e  i n c e n t i v e s  
t o  f i r m s  do n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  co r respond  t o  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t s .  I f  
we add t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  r a t i n g  bureaus  may 
make c a r t e l  p r i c i n g  b e h a v i o r  more l i k e l y ,  t h e n  t h e r e  i s  s t i l l  
a n o t h e r  e f f i c i e n c y  c o s t  t o  a l l o w i n g  r a t i n g  bureaus .  I n  s h o r t ,  
p r o h i b i t i o n  of r a t i n g  b u r e a u s ,  o r  o f  s i m i l a r  exchanges of d a t a ,  
w i l l  do a  l i t t l e  harm. But t h a t  harm may be  much o f f s e t  by t h e  
b e n e f i t s  i n  t e r m s  of  r e s o u r c e  s a v i n g s  and removal o f  t e m p t a t i o n  
t o  d e v i a t e  from c o m p e t i t i v e  p r i c i n g .  
6. CONCLUSION 
These r e s u l t s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  one shou ld  b e  c a u t i o u s  i n  
t r y i n g  t o  i n f e r  what f i r m s  do do  from what t h e y  s a y  (and prob- 
a b l y  t h i n k )  t h e y  a r e  do ing .  Firms may a c t u a l l y  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e y  
a r e  add ing  a  rule-of- thumb s a f e t y  l o a d i n g  t o  t h e i r  b e s t  a c t u a r i a l  
e s t i m a t e  of l o s s e s ,  when i n  f a c t  t h e y  a r e  i n  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  of 
a  b i d d i n g  game. The i n a b i l i t y  of a  f i r m  t o  de fend  i t s  a c t u a l  
r a t i n g  p r a c t i c e  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be  comman. 
I n  t h o s e  c a s e s  i n  which f i r m s  have been asked t o  de fend  
t h e i r  r a t i n g  and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  p r a c t i c e s ,  a s  i n  t h e  N e w  J e r s e y  
au tomobi le  c a s e ,  t h e y  have i n  f a c t  been q u i t e  unab le  t o  do so .  
A s  t h e  i n s u r a n c e  commissioner  of t h e  S t a t e  of  New J e r s e y  n o t e d ,  
f o r  many o f  t h e  r a t i n g  p r a c t i c e s ,  n o t  a  s i n g l e  i n d u s t r y  w i t n e s s  
c o u l d  e x p l a i n  o r  p o i n t  t o  d a t a  which j u s t i f i e d  them. A l l  t h e y  
cou ld  say  was t h a t  t h e y  seemed c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  adequa te  p r o f i t s  
The t h e o r y  i n  t h i s  p a p e r  does  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  p r e d i c t  t h i s  be- 
h a v i o r ,  b u t  it would make it e a s i e r  t o  u n d e r s t a n d .  The i n -  
d e f e n s i b l e  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  wrong. 
REFERENCES 
Bfihlmann, H. 1970. Mathematical Methods in Risk Theory. New 
York: Springer Verlag. 
Chaing, L., and W. Farley. 1979. Pricing Automobile Insurance 
under Multivariate Classification. Journal of Risk and 
Insurance, pp. 75-93. 
Fairley, W., T.J. Tomberlin, and H.1, Weisberg. 1981. Pricing 
Automobile Insurance under a Cross-classification of ~isks. 
Evidence from New Jersey. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 
pp. 505-520. 
Freifelder, L. 1975. Statistical Decision Theory and Credibility 
Theory Procedures. In P.M. Kahn, ed., Credibility: Theory 
and Applications. New York: Academic Press, pp. 71-88. 
Hewitt, C.C. 1963. Credibility for Severity. Proceedings of 
the Casualty Actuarial Society. 
Hickman, J-C. 1975. Introduction and Historical Overview of 
Credibility. In P.M. Kahn, ed., Credibility: Theory and 
~pplications. New York: Academic Press, pp. 181-192. 
National Cornmisslon for the Review of Anti-trust Laws and Pro- 
cedures. U.S. Department of Justice. 1979. Report to the 
President and the Attorney General, pp. 225-251. 
New Jersey Department of Insurance. 1981. Final Determination, 
~nalysis and Report. In Re: Hearing on ~utomobile Insurance 
Classification and Related Methodologies, April 1981. 
Rothkopf, M.H. 1969. A Model of Rational Competitive Bidding. 
Management Science (March), pp. 362-373. 
Smiley, A. 1979. Competitive  idd ding under Uncertainty: The 
Case of Offshore Oil. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co. 
SRI, Inc. 1976. The Role of Risk Classifications in Property 
and Casualty Insurance, Final Report. 
Taylor, G.C, 1375. Credibility under Conditions of Imperfect 
Persistency. In P.M. Kahn, ed., Credibility: Theory and 
Applications. New York: Academic Press, pp, 391-400. 
Tomberlin, T.J. 1981. Empirical Bayes Estimation for Poisson 
Parameters in a Two-way Model. Analysis and Inference, Inc., 
November 5, 1981. 
Wilson, R. 1977. A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition. 
Review of Economic Studies (October), pp. 511-518. 
